FY74 DoD
Security Assistance
Program

COMMANDERS DIGEST

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SECURITY ASSISTANCE: CORNERSTONE of DEFENSE

— Page 2

ADMIRAL MOORER RELATES PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

— Page 5







Peaceful, Stable International Climate

Security Assistance: Cornerstone of Defense

By William P. Clements Jr.
Deputy Secretary of Defense

To preserve and consolidate the gains already achieved by the United States in its effort to create a more peaceful and stable international climate, we must stay on the course which has brought us this far. Both the continuing productivity of Presidential initiatives in establishing the basis for more normal and less precarious relationships with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and successful implementation of the Nixon Doctrine depend directly upon the maintenance of a fully effective Security Assistance Program.

Many contend that such a program has outlived its usefulness and is an anachronism in these days of trend towards detente. To do so is not only to misread the history of the past 25 years but to misinterpret the signs of the times. The record is open to all who care to consult it. That record fully substantiates the conclusion that the world situation in which we currently find new hope for the future would not exist if the people of the United States had earlier refused to concern themselves with the common defense of the Free World. Had we not become "involved" and, for more than two decades, supported and encouraged the efforts of allied and friendly countries to protect themselves against threats to their territorial integrity and internal security, the complexion of the globe might be dangerously different today, and the international climate far more hostile.

Such a setting would certainly not favor Presidential initiatives with Peking and Moscow where military strength is a major element of national policy and this power the primary factor in international relations. The strength of the United States which made those initiatives both possible and productive, and presents the most persuasive argument for the U.S. position at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and other conference tables, is not, however, derived entirely from American resources. Fortunately, we do not confront the

military realities of the mid-1970s in isolated exposure, relying solely on the deterrent and defensive strength of our own arms. Instead, the security of the United States is enhanced and undergirded by the collective framework of strength we have helped our Free World friends and allies build and maintain for our mutual protection against common threats.

The position of strength which we still retain enables us to move forward successfully in negotiations to further the realization of detente. By leading, supporting, and encouraging other Free World nations in their efforts to develop military forces capable of providing for both individual and mutual security, we have successfully prevented potential enemies from preying upon weakness. Had we not provided the military equipment and related training needed by our friends and allies to create and maintain an adequate military posture, we could not now rely on the strength and stability of our Free World partners as an adjunct of the total national power we can bring to bear in our continuing effort to reduce international tension and advance the cause of lasting peace throughout the world.

This reliance is, of course, a basic premise of the Nixon Doctrine as well as the product of past security assistance. The program we propose for Fiscal Year 1974 not only supports that premise, but also serves as a key instrument for putting into practice each of the three principles which that doctrine enunciates:

- The first is partnership with friendly nations in which the obligations, as well as the benefits, of peace are equitably shared.
- The second is a sufficiency of overall military strength, both U.S. and allied, in relation to that of others.
- The third is a willingness, in company with our friends, to negotiate in order to seek solutions to the underlying causes that lead to conflict.

I emphasize the crucial importance to successful negotiations of being in a position to lead from strength. Our power to persuade at the conference table flows largely from the military balance created by the combined military might and solidarity of the Free World.

The military balance at this crucial juncture in world affairs is very delicately poised. We have a great stake in maintaining that balance while we continue to pursue ways to give the world greater stability. I am convinced that our approach to detente, mutual arms limitation and balanced force reduction from a position of United States and Free World strength, has been the key to our successes to date and will continue to be the key to future successes. As long as we, and our friends and allies, are prepared to stand up to a confrontation, we can reasonably expect continuation of progress in this matter.

In planning our own forces and designing our Security Assistance Program, we follow the Total Force concept. Under this concept, we seek to assure a correct balance between what the United States does and what we expect our friends and allies to do.

In cases where we have common defense commitments with other nations, we seek, through advice and assistance, to help our partners do their share under these commitments.

We also seek to complement the principle of partnership and self-reliance of the Nixon Doctrine by assisting other

MILITARY ASSISTANCE—Under Security Assistance Programs, allied military officials often view and monitor U.S. military training activities. (U.S. Navy Photo)

nations to develop their own defense capabilities. This supports the important tenet of the Nixon Doctrine that the nation directly concerned should have the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for its own defense. We believe aggression is best deterred when the nation directly threatened is doing all that it can to assure its own first-line defense. This defense capability, thus, reduces the probability that United States forces could be involved in local conflicts to protect our own interests or fulfill our treaty commitments.

Our friends and allies desire to meet their obligations toward peace and develop a meaningful partnership with the United States. They have already committed a heavy share of their manpower and economic resources toward their own defense. Further development of their own resources will enable them to increase their contribution toward the cost of their defense. The requirements for military security assistance—particularly grant military assistance—from the United States will, therefore, decrease in the years ahead.

The time has not yet come, however, when we may safely lay aside an instrument such as the Military Assistance Program because there are still some allied and friendly countries which cannot yet afford to purchase, either for cash or with Foreign Military Sales credit assistance, the military equipment and training they must have, if they are to play the part we expect them to in their own and the common defense. Their number and the size of the country programs, however, are being reduced as rapidly as possible, consistent with the achievement of U.S. objectives. The proposed FY 1974 Military Assistance Program reflects this decrease in both the number of recipients and the amount of appropriations requested.

This leads me now to discuss a major misconception associated with military assistance. This misconception reflects the degree of misunderstanding that has arisen through the years about the program. One of the factors that has contributed to this misunderstanding and weakened support for military assistance has been a failure to discriminate between purpose and forms of security assistance. Because of the massive grant foreign aid programs of the past, many people today have the misconception that military assistance is a charity—a giveaway-program—designed to influence and win the friendship of underprivileged people of the world.

Many believe it produces few tangible returns for America. Hopefully, my foregoing remarks concerning the purpose and importance of the program will help dispel this misconception. We should also examine the changes in form and scope of the program over the years. Under the Marshall Plan between 1947 and 1951, the United States provided some $11 billion for the recovery of Europe. Today, we propose only a small amount of grant military assistance to two West European countries—Portugal and Spain—and in the case of Spain, this is primarily a *quid pro quo* for base rights. From a high of 45 countries receiving grant material assistance in 1964, we have consistently reduced grant aid recipients to less than half that number.

As a result of our efforts to facilitate the economic recovery of these nations and make them self-sufficient in their own defense, many friendly and allied countries now have the capability either to pay cash for their defense purchases from us or buy with the help of credit funds authorized and appropriated by the Congress. These credits are, of course, repaid to the U.S. Treasury in dollars by the borrower, in full and with interest.

The growing importance of Foreign Military Sales is directly related to both the key role such sales play in support of the Nixon Doctrine and their constantly increasing favorable impact on the national economy. A few key facts fully substantiate that statement:

- In 1965, fifteen years after the inception of our security assistance undertaking, the balance shifted and sales exceeded grant aid.
- Today, Foreign Military Sales are running at a level about eight times that of grant aid.
- During Fiscal Year 1972 alone, nearly $3.5 billion of U.S. defense equipment and articles were sold to friends and allies around the world.
- Thus far in the current fiscal year, Foreign Military Sales have totaled almost $3 billion—$2.4 billion for cash and another $550 million utilizing credit provided in accordance with the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act.

Despite all arguments to the contrary, advanced in all sincerity by those who question the wisdom of selling arms to other nations for any reason or under any circumstances, Foreign Military Sales in this magnitude, and even a larger magnitude, are fully consistent with our national interest. The impor-



SCHOOL SESSION—A U.S. Navy petty officer instructs a small boat school class to allied Navy personnel. (U.S. Navy Photo)

tance attached by the Nixon Doctrine to the encouraging the military self-reliance of our Free World partners makes it axiomatic that nations having the necessary economic capabilty should procure their own military equipment and services for cash or credit on appropriate terms. To deny such countries access to United States military technology and materiel often forces them to procure inferior or more costly arms elsewhere under arrangements which serve neither their own best interests nor those of the United States. Undue restrictions on United States Foreign Military Sales credits are also inconsistent with the national interest because they limit the supply of such credits to less than the demand, and thereby decrease the potential contribution of sales involving credit to strengthening both Free World security and the United States economy and balance of payments position.

With respect to the legislation which the Administration has proposed for Fiscal Year 1974, I would like to emphasize several points:

- Military assistance training and orientation in the United States, offered to the military and military-related civilian personnel of allied and friendly countries, constitute an effective and productive element of the Security Assistance Program. We believe we should place this important program on a more permanent basis than at present. We are proposing, therefore, a new International Military Education and Training Program for FY 1974. We will be asking for $33 million in new appropriations for this purpose during the coming fiscal year.
- We need more flexibility in our Foreign Military Sales activities with Latin American countries. Current legislative restraints on Foreign Military Sales are self-defeating. This is not to say there should not be restraints on arms sales to Latin America—or any part of the world. The restraint should be exercised by means of case-by-case assessment of purchase requests—based upon the criteria of need, ability to pay, effect on neighbors and responsibility for use. This type assessment currently results in refusal of purchase requests that are not consistent with total U.S. interests. Arbitrary ceilings have the effect of putting the countries at odds with each other to obtain U.S. articles and services, of alienating the prospective buyer against the United States Government and forcing him to buy from other sources. I urge that the Latin American ceiling, if it cannot be eliminated, at least be raised to $150 million, excluding cash sales.
- Extension of the credit repayment period from 10 to 20 years is requested to allow the United States Government added flexibility, when justified in our national interest, to help facilitate the transitioning of economically less-developed countries from grant assistance to credit sales.
- We believe the 10 percent foreign currency deposit required of countries receiving grant military assistance should be eliminated because it is inconsistent with the basic concept of a program which is intended to assist countries with restricted economies and scarce resources, [countries] which cannot afford to purchase their defense needs. While some countries can afford the 10 percent deposit, its imposition has proved an irritant in all countries and has been particularly offensive in countries which already offset many U.S. administrative costs.
- We urge authorization of new appropriations for the full amount of the President's request—$652 million for grant military aid, $525 million for Foreign Military Sales credits which will be repaid with interest to the U.S. Treasury by the borrowers, and authorization for the International Military Education and Training Program. As I mentioned, we will be asking the Congress for appropriation of $33 million for grant training in Fiscal Year 1974. I ask approval of a ceiling of $555 million at acquisition value for excess defense articles.

* * * * *

If we are to have an effective Security Assistance Program, it must be funded at the levels requested by the President. Continued inadequate funding, as occurred in both Fiscal Years 1972 and 1973, can only lead to expanded use of our own military manpower and resources in order to preserve the strong position the United States, together with our friends and allies, must maintain in today's world.

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Encouraging Regional Cooperation

U.S. Military Assistance Program Objectives

By Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Security Assistance seeks to support U.S. security objectives in several ways. *First, by enhancing effective self-defense capabilities throughout the free world and when combined with diplomatic and other actions by encouraging regional cooperation between the United States and its allies.* This objective is exemplified by our assistance to Turkey, Greece, and Korea.



Turkey

Turkey's strategic importance is based upon her geography, her determination to maintain independence and sovereignty against historic pressure from the Soviet Union, and the competent and dedicated nature of her armed forces. The constant presence of strong Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean underscores the strategic importance of Turkey to NATO, to CENTO, and to the United States. Our aid to Turkey is designed to assist Turkey in maintaining her NATO forces, including the necessary mobilization base, to facilitate Turkey's growing self-reliance in providing for her own defense needs and to improve the country's capability to provide logistic support for Turkish and allied forces. Turkey's ground forces need increased mobility and fire power. Its navy is handicapped by ship obsolescence and its air force urgently requires replacement for its older fighter aircraft. The magnitude of current and prospective defense requirements far exceeds that which the Turkish economy can reasonably be expected to support. Grant aid in the amount of $85.5 million is proposed for Turkey in Fiscal Year (FY) 1974 and is required to provide armored personnel carriers, tactical communications, tank and anti-tank weapons, and war-reserve munitions. In the absence of this program, Turkey's ability to perform her essential role of protecting the southeastern flank of NATO would be seriously degraded with an increase in the risks to essential U.S. interests. In this regard, I have just returned from a NATO meeting held in Turkey and would like to reaffirm the importance of our Security Assistance Program to Turkey and the importance of Turkey to the defense of the Free World.

Greece

Greece is located in a central position with regard to the strategic areas of the Turkish Straits, the Suez Canal, and the Hellenic Thrace. The Government of Greece announced its decision to terminate grant aid, effective January 1, 1973. Sixty-five million dollars in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit is required to permit Greece to complete the financing of its purchase of aircraft for two F-4E squadrons and other high-priority equipment required for force modernization. This example of increased self-sufficiency on the part of a former grant aid recipient belies the allegation that this program is a static holdover from the post-World War II era.

Korea

The strategic importance of the Republic of Korea stems not only from its proximity to the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Soviet Union and Japan, but also from the nature of its military forces and facilities. These facilities and forces are key elements in the U.S. forward defense strategy in Northeast Asia. In unfriendly hands, the Republic of Korea would pose a major threat to U.S. security interests by serving as a platform for aggression against the Japanese homeland and other islands to the south. The Korean people have determinedly resisted continued communist aggression and have remained a staunch and loyal ally. In order to assist in maintaining the Republic of Korea as an independent nation, the United States initiated in FY 1971 a Korean force modernization plan. The reduced level of funding for the Military Assistance Program (MAP) in FY 1972 degraded this plan by some $85 million and prohibited reaching our planned objectives. Similarly, reduced funding in 1973 severely constrained the over-all program. The objectives established by the five-year plan remain valid and implementation is essential to the maintenance of a credible deterrent posture in the Republic of Korea. The program for FY 1974 includes $238.8 million in grant assistance and $25 million for FMS. Any significant reduction in grant aid would seriously jeopardize the modernization plan. The Republic of Korea has based its defense plans on the accomplishment of the five-year modernization plan and regards the U.S. contribution to this program as an indicator of our commitment to Treaty obligations. We should not abandon our interests in this area.

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Second, our Security Assistance Program supports our security objectives by enabling U.S. allies and friends to maintain internal security and counter aggression individually or with regional assistance without direct engagement of U.S. forces. It is essential that our friends and allies maintain the capability to resist internal subversion and to maintain the peace in the face of local rivalries. They must be strong enough to cope with such strife without our involvement. If we are to honor our treaty commitments, and we must, it is essential that our allies create an ability to deter subtheater localized aggression to a greater extent than in the past. The Philippines, Thailand, and Cambodia are examples of countries in which we are striving toward this objective.

Philippines

Our ties with the Philippines are bound in history and formalized under SEATO and our bilateral mutual defense treaties.

Economic growth of the Philippines, since its independence from the U.S. was granted in 1946, has been slow and is still insufficient to permit the country to meet its full military requirements. This is particularly true in the face of the current insurgency. The people of the Philippines require assistance to modernize their armed forces and their constabulary.

The security assistance material program amounting to $19.3 million and the $3 million FMS credit is designed to provide mobility, firepower, and communications—the three basic elements required to combat insurgency forces. We are providing helicopters and transport aircraft, machine guns, recoilless rifles, and other weapons, together with long-range communications equipment. In order to assist the Government of the Philippines in improving its anti-smuggling capability and logistics support, we are also providing naval patrol and mobility aircraft. Through our long-standing association with the Philippines, to include the Security Assistance Program, the United States has had unimpeded use of bases such as Clark Air Base and the naval base at Subic.

Thailand

Politically, Thailand has a leading position among Southeast Asian nations. It is a major rice producing and exporting country. Its armed forces and geography contribute greatly to the growing stability in that unhappy part of the world and to SEATO. The Thai Government has permitted us to maintain on her soil bases for the military forces necessary to support the U.S. interests in Indochina. The internal stability and security of Thailand have been threatened by a Communist inspired and supported insurgency. Countering this insurgency is the responsibility of the Thai Government, but it cannot fully discharge this responsibility without technical and material support from the United States. Our assistance program is designed to assist in the training and development of the Thai armed forces so that they can maintain internal security and stability and be able to conduct effective military operations, in conjunction with allies, in the event of a major external aggression. We are requesting about $60 million in grant aid so that the Thais may modernize their armed forces and increase the level of operations against the insurgents. We will provide aircraft, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, and communications equipment. We, of course, anticipate reducing our grant aid as the Thai capability to counter the insurgency is achieved. The Thais will then assume more of the operating costs now made by grant aid and will acquire equipment through cost-shared procedures and FMS. An independent and friendly Thailand serves as a stabilizing influence in the entire Southeast Asia area. Our assistance is necessary to preserve this influence.

Cambodia

Unfortunately, in spite of the President of Cambodia's efforts, including a unilaterally declared ceasefire, continuing hostilities require that substantial grant assistance be provided the Government of Khmer Republic, so that it may establish and maintain forces capable of sustaining Cambodia's independence. A major factor contributing to the fighting in Cambodia is the fragmented organization of the insurgents. This results in the absence of a single negotiating partner with whom to negotiate a ceasefire. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam does not appear to be inclined either to negotiate an end to the fighting itself or to pressure other insurgent groups to negotiate. Currently, there are at least 70-75,000 troops located in Cambodia opposing the Government of the Khmer Republic, about half of which are Vietnamese. The U.S. assistance programs are designed to help develop light infantry with limited artillery and air support. The $167.2 million program for Cambodia is intended to provide her with the wherewithal to resist aggression on the

The Military Realities of Security Assistance

Editor's note: In a recent appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, outlined a number of crucial military realities affecting the United States 1974 Security Assistance Program. Admiral Moorer's comments on the subject are of particular significance to military commanders and staffs involved in the organization and operation of Security Assistance Programs around the world.

* * * * *

"The following military realities are of particular importance:

- The ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms reflect the relative strategic parity that now exists between the United States and the Soviet Union.
- The Soviet quantitative strategic superiority in the number of missile launchers, megatonnage, and throw weight is compensated for by U.S. quantitative superiority in numbers of warheads and our overall qualitative strategic superiority. It should be noted, however, that the Soviet Union is steadily narrowing our technological lead and has the potential to overtake our quantitative lead in numbers of warheads.
- The fundamental change in the overall strategic balance reflected above places greater emphasis on general purpose forces, while at the same time, political, fiscal, and manpower realities have prescribed smaller U.S. general purpose forces.
- Our potential adversaries continue to improve their large general purpose forces, particularly with regard to modernization of weapons and equipment.

It is against this background that we must consider the role played by our allies and examine the impact of the Security Assistance Program. A judicious and viable Security Assistance Program supports our efforts to maintain a deterrent against aggression. Our decreasing general purpose forces require that we place much greater reliance upon our allies in the common defense. As the President has said:

> 'Unless we in America work to preserve the peace, there will be no peace. Unless we in America work to preserve freedom, there will be no freedom . . . we shall do our share in defending peace and freedom in the world, but we shall expect others to do their share.' "

RESCUE MISSION—U.S. military personnel assigned to duty with U.S. missions overseas participate in rescue activities when natural disasters unexpectedly strike.
(U.S. Army Photo by Sp4 Thomas E. Lincoln)

ground. Of course, Khmer requirements for external assistance are directly related to the prospects of a Cambodian peace settlement. The Khmer Republic, while maintaining a neutral political stance and continuing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, has determined to resist the North Vietnamese invasion and maintain the Khmer Nation as an independent country in Southeast Asia. Our current air operations and Security Assistance Program are essential to this effort.

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Third, providing all or part of the quid pro quo essential for rights, authorizations, and facilities arrangements. We have global interests which are vital to our continued economic and political survival. Our forward defense strategy is designed to protect these interests, and advance basing helps insure the result.

Spain

The U.S. military assistance being provided to Spain is a part of the compensation called for by the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation. Spain is of strategic importance because it dominates the western approaches to the Mediterranean and provides major air and naval facilities. The agreement enables us to maintain these important facilities until 1975. The $3 million grant aid contained in the FY 1974 request will provide for Spanish force modernization and contribute to closer Spanish associations with Western security interests.

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Finally, fostering favorable attitudes toward the U.S. and its policy and encouraging recipients to pursue military objectives compatible with U.S. military strategy.

Latin America

Latin America represents an excellent example of this objective. We have had continuing interests, as well as long-standing friendly relations, with most of the nations of Latin America. The objective of Security Assistance in this area is to insure the continuance of our traditional effective ties with the armed forces of the region. We believe that our minimum levels of Military Assistance help to prevent the establishment of a military power base hostile to the United States in this hemisphere.

Total Force Concept

The Total Force concept is implemented by capitalizing on the potential of our available resources and assets, to include the military forces of our allies. It follows, of course, that reliance upon our allies requires that their forces be manned, trained, equipped and combat ready. Otherwise, such reliance would detract from our own security. The alternative, as unpalatable as this may be today, is larger U.S. general purpose forces. The Total Force concept will acquire purpose and credibility only if we assist those nations with whom we have mutual security interests. An inadequate Security Assistance Program could, therefore, jeopardize our existing commitments, both in a regional and a bilateral sense, and thereby increase the risks to our own vital interests.

Foreign Military Sales

The Foreign Military Sales portion of the Security Assistance Program yields certain indirect military and economic benefits which impact favorably on U.S. security interests and deserve some examination. The volume of U.S. foreign military, government-to-government, and commercial sales equalled $1.4 billion in 1970, $2.6 billion in 1971, and $4 billion in 1972. Projected figures for 1973 and 1974 are $4.5 and $5.4 billion, respectively. These sales have had a significant, favorable impact on our balance-of-payments problem and produce major benefits in terms of maintaining U.S. defense production lines and cost reductions associated with sharing the overhead for U.S. equipment.

I am not unaware of the criticism of any arms sales and the legitimate concern for channeling the scarce resources of developing countries into economic and domestic progress. But we cannot dictate to other nations. If a nation is convinced that its security is threatened and judges its arms requirements differently than we do, our ability to affect its decision is limited to our power to persuade. Our power to persuade is dependent upon the goodwill, the confidence and trust we have developed with the military leaders, governments, and people of these countries. If we refuse to provide the military equipment these nations feel is necessary to their security, the choice they face is to forego the material they consider essential to the continued development of their armed forces or to acquire it from either Western Europe, the Soviet Union or the PRC. Experience has demonstrated that the choice is an easy one. When we have been unable to sell U.S. military material or services, our friends and allies

MISSION BRIEFING—U.S. military pilots often serve tours overseas as instructors and advisers with Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs). (U.S. Navy Photo)

have turned to other sources. These sources often provide material far more sophisticated and far more expensive than otherwise available U.S. equipment. If we provide the material, our power to persuade is enhanced and our ultimate purpose—peaceful evolution and development—is served.

Section 514 and MAAGS

No discussion of the security aspects of the Foreign Assistance Act would be complete without commenting upon the adverse effect of Section 514 of the Act and noting the role played by our Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) and Missions.

The Secretary has already noted many of the reasons we urgently request the repeal of Section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which requires a 10 percent payment to the U.S. for grant aid and excess defense articles, except under limited circumstances. I recognize that the intent of this provision was to insure budgetary discipline by the host country. My discussions with military leaders, however, clearly indicates that our friends and allies believe that such a requirement is not only a real reduction in resources available for national defense, but also officious intermeddling and insulting. In more than one nation, friendly relationships have been damaged by what the host country conceives of as our effort to couple the needs of the common defense with the desire to dictate how they should run their national economy.

The role of Military Assistance Advisory Groups is broader in scope than the processing of Military Assistance Program requests, training quotas and sales agreements. The Chief of the Advisory Group, under the general supervision of the Ambassador, serves as the Secretary of Defense's representative with the Ministry of National Defense and is a high-level adviser to the military establishment of the host government. He also serves as the essential link between the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Unified Command and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on one hand, and the host government on the other. In the past ten years, advisory personnel manyears have dropped from 9,553 to 2,280. In accordance with Section 512 of the Foreign Assistance Act, a reduction in assigned U.S. military personnel in excess of 15 percent has been made.

Many ongoing projects whereby military assistance functions are changing from the traditional unit advisory tasks to higher level management activity aimed at improving long-term country self-sufficiency would be jeopardized by any significant reduction now in MAAG strength beyond that already planned. Additional significant reductions now could force the advisory effort to deteriorate to an unacceptable degree. Also, most countries view continuing reductions in MAAG strength as another indication of lessening U.S. interest in support of their self-sufficiency—a signal we certainly do not wish to make at this time.

Summary

In conclusion, grant aid and Foreign Military Sales are integral parts of our national security program and must continue to be based on the actual and growing military capabilities of our potential adversaries. We must also continue to insure adequate protection for those global interests which are vital to our economic and political survival. The Total Force concept is an important element in this defensive strategy. An effective Security Assistance Program provides only those essential resources, otherwise unavailable, to assist our allies in sharing the defense of the Free World. An inadequate Security Assistance Program could jeopardize our existing treaty commitments and cast doubt on our continued presence in forward defense areas which are essential to our national security. Continued eroding of our Security Assistance Program will most likely result in increased requirements in U.S. force levels to meet our national security needs, with a resulting larger total national security expenditure.

The Nixon Doctrine envisages our allies relying to a greater extent on the use of their own resources, particularly manpower, in the deterrence of aggression and the common defense. The Security Assistance Program, through the provision of minimum essential material and training, serves to help our friends and allies to help themselves. This raises the threshhold of direct U.S. involvement, and it also yields certain military and economic advantages that impact favorably on U.S. security interests. Multiple advantages also accrue to the United States through the Foreign Military Sales Program.

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